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THE USA PATRIOT ACT: A POLICY OF ALIENATIONt
Kam C. Wong*
And we must be mindful that as we seek to win the war that we treat
Arab Americans and Muslims with the respect they deserve.
-Statement from President Bush (September 13th, 2001)'
The act, written in response to the September 11 attacks, in theory
applies to all citizens, but it was written with Muslims in mind and in
practice denies them their civil liberties by empowering law enforcement
authorities to raid their homes, offices, and mosques in the name of the
war on terrorism.
-Geneive Abdo (2005)2
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1. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, President Pledges Assis-
tance for New York in Phone Call with Pataki, Giuliani: Remarks by the President in
Telephone Conversation with New York Mayor Giuliani and New York Governor Pataki
(Sept. 13, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010913-4.html.
2. Geneive Abdo, Islam in America: Separate but Unequal, WASH. Q. 7, 12(2005);
see also Chrystie Flournoy Swiney, Racial Profiling of Arabs and Muslims in the US:
Historical, Empirical, and Legal Analysis Applied to the War on Terrorism, 3 MUSLIM
WORLD JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (2006) (Post-9/11 profiling of Muslims is not a
cost-effective deterrent to terrorists and threats. The government needs to re-evaluate
post-9/11 anti-Muslim policies and practices in place) available at http://www.bepress.
com/mwjhr/vol3/issl/art3.
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INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2001, terrorists attacked America without warn-
ing, killing 2,752 people.3 That same day, President George W Bush
promised that "The United States will hunt down and punish those re-
sponsible for these cowardly acts."4 On October 26, 2001, President Bush
signed into law the USA PATRIOT ACT (USAPA or the Act).' The
USAPA gave law enforcement officials expansive powers and security
agencies increased resources to fight terrorism, both at home and abroad.
6
Throughout the entire USAPA legislative process, neither Congress nor
3. See "The final death toll of the attack upon the World Trade Center on Septem-
ber 11th, 2001," http://www.ourcivilisation.com/usa/tol.htm. The FBI reported 3,047
victims from all locations of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Fed. Bureau of
Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports: Crime in the United States 2001, 302.
4. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, Remarks by the President
Upon Arrival at Barksdale Air Force Base (Sept. 11, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2001/09/2001091 1-1.html.
5. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.107-056, 115 Stat. 272
(2001).
6. For legal analysis, see Charles Doyle, Cong. Research Serv., CRS REPORT FOR
CONGRESS:THE USA PATRIOT ACT:A LEGAL ANAMYsis (2002).
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the Administration systematically investigated or comprehensively consid-
ered the relative utilities and likely impact of the Act.
7
The USAPA is now five years old and little is known about the im-
plementation, and in turn the impact, of the Act. While the Bush
administration, as supported by a Republican Congress,8 was quick to
push for the reinventing and renewing of the Act, 9 there is very little in-
formation on the law's impact and virtually no assessment of its
effectiveness. As observed by Nancy Kranich:
Almost two years after passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, lit-
tle is known about how the law is being used to track
terrorists or innocent Americans. The Justice Department has
foiled numerous attempts by lawmakers and civil libertarians
to learn how the Administration has deployed new tools
granted under the Act. Congressional hearings this spring
yielded virtually no new information about the number of
times individuals' library records have been sought or how
many court orders have been obtained to watch someone's
computer activities or conduct other surveillance on U.S. citi-
zens. Justice officials claim that even generic numbers are
classified, and are provided confidentially only to congressional
intelligence committees.0
7. See Kam C. Wong, The USA PATRIOT Act: Some Unanswered Questions, 34
INT'L J. Soc. L. 1-41 (2006).
8. CNN, House Approves Renewal of Patriot Act: Critics Voice Concern Over
Civil Liberties, CNN.coM,July 22, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/07/21/
patriot.act ("The final vote was 257-171.The bill makes permanent 14 of 16 provisions in
the act set to expire next year and extends two others for another 10 years ... In the final
tally, 14 Republicans bucked Bush and the party leadership to vote against the Patriot Act
renewal. Among Democrats, 43 supported it, while 156 voted no"); see also CNN, Patriot
Act Renewal Fails in Senate: GOP Fights to Save Provisions Before End-of-Year Deadline,
CNN.coM, Dec. 16, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/12/16/patriot.act
(discussing the defeat of the renewal of USAPA bill by filibuster in the Senate).
9. See Associated Press, President urges renewal of Patriot Act, USA TODAY, Apr.
17, 2004, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2004-04-17-bush-
terrorism_x.htm ("To abandon the Patriot Act would deprive law enforcement and intel-
ligence officers of needed tools in the war on terror, and demonstrate willful blindness to a
continuing threat"); see also R. Jeffrey Smith, Attorney General Urges Renewal of Patriot
Act: Gonzales Gives First Policy Speech, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2005, at A2 (USAPA "has
helped prevent additional terrorist attacks ... Giving law enforcement the tools they need
to keep America safe while honoring our values").
10. Nancy Kranich, Commentary: The Impact of the USA PATRIOT Act: An Up-
date, THE FREE ExPREssiON POLICY PROJECT (FEPP), BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT
NYU SCHOOL OF LAW, Aug. 27, 2003, http://www.fepproject.org/commentaries/
patriotactupdate.html.
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The Bush administration has routinely resorted to national secu-
rity,1 executive privilege,' 2 operational secrecy, 3 or Presidential fiat 4 to
keep the specifics of the Act secret from the public. As time passes, the
unintended consequences of the Act and related anti-terrorism measures
have mushroomed, resulting in ramifications that are increasingly felt
throughout American society. Foreign students have been deterred from
coming to the United States.'" Librarians have started to concern them-
selves with government monitoring activities. 6 Neither of these examples,
however, compare to the impact felt by Muslims in the U.S., the group
most affected by the Act. 7
Muslims, individually and as a group, have been singled out for spe-
cial (mis)treatment since 9/11,'8 in ways ranging from domestic
11. See DOJ Oversight: Terrorism and other Topics Before the H. Comm. On the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 16 (2004) (When Senator Grassley asked why the Attorney Gen-
eral classified information about whistleblower Edmonds, a translator who was fired from
the FBI, the Attorney General said, "If I am not mistaken, in the matter to which you
make reference, the national interests of the United States would be seriously impaired if
information provided in one briefing to the Congress were to be generally available").
12. See id. at 98. (When questioned by Senator Durbin on a memo defining per-
missible torture by Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee, the Attorney General refused to
answer on executive privilege grounds).
13. Seth Rosenfeld, 9-11-01: Looking Back, Looking Ahead: A Nation Remembers: Patriot
Acts Scope, Secrecy Ensnare Innocent, Critics Say, S.F CHRON., Sept. 8, 2002, at Al, available at
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2002/09/08/MN30478.DTL ("So far,
the full impact of the Patriot Act remains unknown, partly because the Bush administra-
tion has insisted on secrecy that some courts and members of Congress have called
excessive").
14. See Edward Epstein, Bush to Face Tough Questions Over Patriot Act, Spy Orders, S.F
CHRONICLE, Dec. 24, 2005, at All, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2005/12/24/MNGBOGD4FF1.DTL (The President ordered elec-
tronic surveillance on US soil without consulting Congress).
15. See Adrian Arroyo, Comments: The USA PATRIOT Act and the Enhanced Border
Security and Visa Entry Reform Act: Negatively Impacting Academic Institutions by Deterring For-
eign Students from Studying in the United States, 16 ThANSNAT'L LAWY. 411 (2003), available at
http://www.iienetwork.org/index.v3page?d-v=rm&dmid=
50357&p=3331 1.
16. See American Library Association, The USA Patriot Act in the Library,
http://www.ala.org/ala/oif/ifissues/usapatriotactlibrary.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2006)
("[The USA PATRIOT Act's]... enhanced surveillance procedures pose the greatest chal-
lenge to privacy and confidentiality in the library").
17. See infra Section II: "Literature Review."
18. Muslims were not the only group of people who were subject to indiscriminate
application of post-9/11 counter-terrorism measures. See e.g. David Morton, Detained,
CLEVELAND FREE TIMEs, Dec. 17, 2001, http://alternet.org/story/12092 (describing an
incident in which eleven Israelis were rounded up and questioned after being picked up
for visa violations. They were detained in local jails with no legal justification, rights or
due process); see also Eric Lichtblau, New Details on F.B.I. Aid for Saudis after 9/11, N.Y
TIMES, Mar. 27, 2005, at 8 (describing how some Arabs and Muslims were luckier than
others. The Bush administration helped hundreds of prominent Arabs escape the frontal
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registration and airport profiling to immigration detention. 9 The USAPA
enables the government to monitor, investigate, detain, and deport Mus-
lims legally in the name of security, without rudimentary due process of
the law and in gross violation of their rights.
2
1
This Article provides a brief overview of how Muslims were treated
after 9/11. It documents how the USAPA and related measures have been
used to monitor, investigate, detain, and deport Muslim U.S. citizens in
violation of their civil rights.2 1 Of particular importance, is how the life
circumstances of the Muslims in America have changed for the worse as a
result of zealous enforcement and discriminatory application of the
USAPA.22 In so doing, this Article seeks to provide concrete facts and a
rich context to ascertain the implications of 9/11 on American society.
Based on a larger research project,23 this Article points to the need
for systematic and comprehensive investigation into the impact of the
USAPA on the Muslim community in the U.S., and in turn analyzes the
implications of 9/11 on American society.24
attack of the 9/11 aftermath) available at http://www.nytimes.come/2005/03/27/
politics/27exodus.html.
19. See Louise Cainkar, Post 9/11 Domestic Policies Affecting U. S. Arabs and Mus-
lims: A Brief Review, 24 COMP. STUD. S. ASIA, AFR. AND MIDDLE E. 247 (2004).
20. See, e.g., Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, 107th Cong., Re-
port to Congress on Implementation of Section 1001 of the USA PATRIOT Act: (as
required by Section 1001 (3) of Public Law 107-56) (2002); Philip Shenon, Report on U.S.
Antiterrorism Law Alleges Violations of Civil Rights, N.Y TIMES,July 21,2003 at Al.
21. See CATO INSTITUTE, CATO HANDBOOK FOR CONGRESS: POLICY RECOMMENDA-
TIONS FOR THE 108th CONGRESS 117-24 (Edward H. Crane & David Boaz eds., 2003);
AsiaSource, Interview by Nevmeen Shaikh with Dalia Hashad, Advocate, ACLU (Apr. 10,
2003), http://www.asiasource.org/news/special-reports/hashad.cfi-n.
22. See Steven Salaita, Ethnic Identity and Imperative Patriotism: Arab Americans
Before and After 9/11, 32 C. LITERATURE 146 (2005) (examining "the effects of 9/11 on
Arab Americans and other minorities").
23. This Article is the result of a four-year research project (2002-2006) by the
author entitled, "The Impact and Implications of USA PATRIOT Act on American Soci-
ety." Research output to date includes: Kam C. Wong, The USA Patriot Act: Some
Unanswered Questions, 34 INTr'L J. Soc. L. 1-41 (2006) (on historical context); Kam C.
Wong, The Making of the USA PATRIOT ACT I: The Legislative Process and Dynamics, 34
INT'L J. Soc. L. 179-219 (2006) (on the legislative process); Kam C. Wong, The Making of
the USA PATRIOT ACT II: Public Sentiments, Legislative Climate, Political Gamesmanship,
Media Patriotism, 34 INT'L J. Soc. L. 105-40 (2006) (on the political environment); Kam C.
Wong, Implementing the USA PATRIOT ACT: A Case Study of the Student and Exchange
Visitor Information System (SEVIS), 2 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1 (2006) (on implementation
problems).
24. Charles Doyle, Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for Congress: USA Patriot
Act Sunset: Provisions That Expire on December 31, 2005, 1 (June 10, 2004) (Subsection
224(a) of the USAPA indicates that various sections in Title II of the Act are to remain in
effect only until December 31, 2005) available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/
RL32186.pdf.
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This Article is organized into the following sections. Section I is a
"Literature Review" of popular and scholarly readings, which notes that
while there were many discussions over the impact of the USAPA, many
of them were produced by interested parties, and more than a few of
them are tainted by motives ranging from patriotism to political games-
manship.2 Section II details the "Research Questions and Model of
Analysis." Section III provides an overview of "Post 9/11 Counter-
Terrorism Strategy", such as total information control. Section IV dis-
cusses "Post 9/11 Counter-Terrorism Operations" including FBI dragnet
and INS preventive detention. The Conclusion provides a detailed ac-
count and in-depth analysis of the "Impact Upon the Muslim
Community and Implications for America."
I. LaimATuE REVIEW
A cursory review of news accounts,26 investigative reports,27 popular
readings,2 commissioned studies,2 Congressional testimonies,3" panelists'
25. Wong, The Making of the USA PATRIOT Act II, supra note 23.
26. Rosenfeld, supra note 13.
27. Caught in the Crossfire: Arab Americans in Wartime (PBS television broadcast
Sept. 4, 2002) (following the lives of three Arab American New Yorkers after the Septem-
ber 11th terrorist attacks).
28. William Fisher, Govt Targets Arab, Muslim Americans Again, ANTIwAR.coM,
Oct. 5, 2004, http://www.antiwar.com/ips/fisher.php?articleid=3707 (FBI agents are
again contacting Arab and Muslim Americans for "voluntary interviews" before Nov. 2,
2004 election to intimidate electorate or impress would-be voters of war on terror); see
also Abdus Sattar Ghazali, Muslims American Muslims Four Years After 9/11, American
Muslim Perspective, Sept. 11, 2005, http://www.amperspective.com/html/four_years
after_9-11.html ("Stereotyping and scapegoating Muslims and Islam remain a popular past
time for the US media... ").
29. ARAB AM. INST.,HEALING THE NATION: THE ARAB AMERICAN EXPERIENCE AFTER
SEPTEMBER 11 (2002), http://www.arabvoices.net/healing-the-nation.pdf.
30. See, e.g., Detainees: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. (2005) (statement of Glenn A. Fine, Inspector Gen. U.S. Dep't of Justice) (surnma-
rizing findings and recommendations to OIG's June 2003 report entitled "The September
11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in
Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks" and December 2003
report, entitled "Supplemental Report on September 11 Detainees'Allegations of Abuse at
the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York"); America after 9/11: Free-
dom Preserved or Freedom Lost?: Hearing Before U.S. Sen. Judiciary Comm., 108th
Cong. (2003) (testimony of Dr. James Zogby, President of Arab Am. Inst.); Implementation
of the USA Patriot Act: Prohibition of Material Support Under Sections 805 of the USA
Patriot Act and 6603 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005).
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presentations,3 learned treatises, 32 and journal articles3  makes it clear that
9/11 has had a grave impact on American society. The USAPA, for better
or worse, has come to be associated with the war on terror. Harmful im-
pacts of the Act on America are evident everywhere. No one was spared,
even Senator Kennedy was stopped from boarding a plane five times be-
cause his name appeared on the "no fly" list.3 All matters have been
impacted, including travel and banking. 3s A systematic and comprehensive
analysis of related literature shows that Muslims in America suffered the
most as a result of Bush's war on terror.
36
31. See Virginia Law, Panelists Examine Consequences of Patriot Act, Oct. 3, 2005,
http://www.law.virginia.edu/home2002/html/news/2005-fall/patriotact.htm (Panelists
included: Imad Damaj, President,Va. Muslim Coal. For Pub. Affars; Ken Willis, Executive
Dir., ACLU ofVa.; Robert M. O'Neil, Law Prof. and Dir. of the Thomas Jefferson Ctr.).
32. See, e.g., NAT HENTOFF, THE WAR ON THE BILL OF RIGHTS-AND THE GATHERING
RESISTANCE (2003); LOST LIBERTIES: ASHCROFT AND THE ASSAULT ON PERSONAL FREEDOM
(Cynthia Brown ed., 2003) [with an introduction by Aryeh Neier]; THE WAR ON OUR
FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr.
eds., 2003); David Lyon, SURVEILLANCE AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 (2003); Barbara Olshansky &
the Ctr for Constitutional Rights, SECRET TRIALS AND EXECUTIONS: MILITARY TRIBUNALS
AND THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY (2002); Christian Parenti, THE SOFT CAGE: SURVEILLANCE
IN AMERICA FROM SLAVERY TO THE WAR ON TERROR (2003).
33. Sunaina Maira, Youth Culture, Citizenship and Globalization: South Asian Muslim
Youth in the United States After September 11th, 24 COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF SOUTH ASIA,
AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST 219-231 (2004); Muqtedar Khan, American Muslims and the
Rediscovery of Americas Sacred Ground, in TAKING RELIGIOUS PLURALISM SERIOUSLY: SPIRI-
TUAL POLITICS ON AMERICA'S SACRED GROUND 137 (Barbara A. McGraw & Renee
Formicola eds., 2005), available at http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/
fellows/khanchapter.pdf (prior to Sept. 11th, the external influence and cultural identity
of Muslims was strong. But, after 9/11 the Muslim community was put on the defensive,
and that identity was shaken. The USAPA in particular was a rude awaking for the Muslim
community).
34. Sarah Kehaulani Goo, Terror no-fly list singled out Kennedy. Senator was stopped 5 times
at airports, S.F. CHRONICLE, Aug. 20, 2004, at A3, available at http://
www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2004/08/20/MNGQ28BMO1.DTL.
35. See, e.g., Harvey M. Silets & Carol R.Van Cleef, Compliance Issues in the Wake of
the USA PATRIOT Act, 10 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL CRIME 392 (2003) (compliance with
USAPA is costly and non-compliance is devastating); James Fisher, James Gilsinan, Ellen
Harshman, Muhammed Islam & FredYeager, Assessing the Impact of the USA PATRIOTAct
on the Financial Services Industry, 8 JOURNAL OF MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 243 (2005) (a
cost-benefit analysis of the Act in not possible since the deterrent effect of the Act cannot
be ascertained. Experience with the Act to date, however, confirms that there are substan-
tial financial costs and a whole host of privacy concerns).
36. Information available on the impact of 9/11 in general and as a result of the
USAPA was limited by the pre-9/11 information-communication structure in the Nation
and within the immigrants' communities. The reporting on the impact and effect of 9/11
might also be biased against reporting positive news. For a discussion of the information
flow within immigrant network pre- and post-9/1 1, see Suzette B. Masters & Ted
Perlmutter, Reactions of the Immigration Community to the Events of September 11 th
(2002), http://www.newschool.edu/icmec/reaction.html (last visited Oct. 18,2006).
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One of the most critical and damning reports of post 9/11 anti-
terrorism performance and its impact on Muslims and aliens, came from
the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of Justice
(DOJ). The OIG testified before the Congress as to the plight of 9/11
detainees:
Our review determined that 762 aliens were detained on im-
migration charges in connection with the PENTTBOM
3 7
investigation in the first 11 months after the terrorist attacks
... Our review found that many September 11 detainees did
not receive notice of the charges against them in a timely
manner ... More than a quarter of the 762 detainees' clearance
investigations took longer than 3 months ... Our review
found serious problems in the treatment of the September 11
detainees housed at the MDC ... the BOP3 imposed a total
communications blackout for several weeks on the September
11 detainees held at the MDC39 ... Most of the September 11
detainees did not have legal representation prior to their de-
tention at the MDC ... detainees were placed in full restraints
whenever they were moved, including handcuffs, leg irons, and
heavy chains ... The detainees also were subjected to having
two lights illuminated in their cells 24 hours a day ... We con-
cluded that on occasion staff members used strip searches to
intimidate and punish detainees. "
The government's high handed counter-terrorism measures and tac-
tics were egregious enough to attract the intervention of the court. The
judge in United States v. Awadallah, 202 E Supp.2d 55, (S.D.N.Y 2002)
opined:
Having committed no crime-indeed, without any claim that
there was probable cause to believe he had violated any law-
[the witness] bore the full weight of the prison system de-
signed to punish convicted criminals as well as incapacitate
individuals arrested or indicted for criminal conduct ... [He
was] repeatedly strip-searched, shackled whenever he [was]
moved, denied food that complies with his religious needs ...
prohibited from seeing or even calling his family over the
course of 20 days and then [pressured into] testifying while
handcuffed to a chair.
37. "PETTBOM" is the FBI code name for the investigation into the September
11, 2001 "Pentagon/Twin Towers Bombing." It is the largest FBI investigation in U.S.
history.
38. Acronym stands for "Bureau of Prison."
39. Acronym stands for "Metropolitan Detention Center."
40. Hearings, supra note 30 (statement of Glenn A. Fine).
[VOL. 12:161
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The observations of the government and opinions of the court also
found their way into the press, as newsworthy human stories. For exam-
ple, The Times of London in May 2003 received this letter from Tony
Willoughby ofWilloughby & Partners, a firm of solicitors:
The head of IT at our law firm is a Muslim. He is a gentleman
in every sense of the word. His fanaticism, if he has any, is re-
stricted to cricket. Sunday he went on a business trip to
California. On arrival at Los Angeles he was detained and in-
terrogated on suspicion of being a terrorist ... ."For the first
12 hours he was refused access to a telephone. After 16 hours,
not having been given any food, he asked if he could have
some. He was given ham sandwiches and, when he explained
that he could not eat pork, was told: 'You eat what you are
given. He did not eat. He was eventually escorted back to the
airport in handcuffs and deported."
The San Francisco Chronicle has documented many instances of the
USAPA being used in abusive ways." For example, a Pakistani scientist
and permanent U.S. resident was asked by the FBI why he ordered certain
technical books via E-bay 3 E-Bay was suspected of providing the infor-
mation to the FBI. 44 A group of Middle East students from San Francisco
State University turned over to the FBI a fax pointing to an Arabic ter-
rorist warning. Instead of investigating the looming threat, the FBI
investigated the student group as suspected terrorists.45 A Muslim woman,
with a traditional face covering, went to the Bank of America branch near
Tarzana (Los Angeles County) where she had been a customer for 10
years, but the bank refused to cash her check or open her account because
she looked suspicious. 46 Randy Hamud, a Muslim lawyer in San Diego
who has represented several men detained since September 11, had his
phone tapped and computer searched. 7 Barry Reingold, 61, a retired Pa-
cific Bell employee, was visited and questioned by FBI agents for being
critical of US foreign policy when working out in a San Francisco gym.4
His name was supplied to the FBI as a result of Operation TIPS (Terror-
ism Information and Prevention System).49 Soon after the September 11
attacks, FBI agents went to the San Francisco home of Kamal Hakim,
41. A Tale of Two Brits, Posting of David Cohen, http://www.brothersjudd.com/
blog/archives/009541.html (Dec. 9, 2003).
42. Rosenfeld, supra note 13.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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who came to the United States from Yemen and became a permanent
resident in 1995. Hakim, 34, said he voluntarily spoke twice with agents,
who asked about his associates, his travels and his views on the attacks."0
Similar observations were made by other individual state govern-
ment" and university studies.12 For instance, the California Senate Office
of Research investigated the personal experience and human costs of the
war on terror as well as the tactics used by the federal government to
prosecute the war on terror. It found that many Muslim, South Asians,
and Arab immigrants in California have faced humiliation, embarrassment
and intrusions of privacy 3 To blame for this problem, is the "sometimes
overzealous enforcement of the Patriot Act, including indefinite deten-
tions, secret searches and surveillance and the monitoring of computer
traffic."
5 4
The implementation of the Act and related measures has affected
Muslims in America individually and collectively, in psychological, social,
economic and political terms. Imand Damaj, president of the Virginia
Muslim Coalition for Public Affairs, best summed up the Muslim experi-
ence post 9/11 by noting:
After 9/11, I learned that free speech is not an equal right to
all of us ... National origin, skin color, accent, religion do
make a difference ... It's a sad reality, but that's the reality ... It
is hard to quantify the impact of the Patriot Act itself, because
it's not only the Patriot Act ... A lot of people feel they are be-
ing treated as guilty by association. We know we are under
supervision in our mosque and worship centers.We have regu-
lar visits from the FBI in Richmond ... We certainly feel that
our citizenship is becoming less and less meaningful . ..
50. Id.
51. Max Vanzi, SEN. OFFICE OF RESEARCH,THE PATRIOT ACT: OTHER POST-9/11 EN-
FORCEMENT POWERS AND THE IMPACT ON CALIFORNIA'S MUSLIM COMMUNITIES: FROM A
CALIFORNIA PERSPECTIVE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE FALLOUT FROM INVESTIGATIONS, INTERROGA-
TIONS, ARRESTS, DETENrIONS, AND DEPORTATIONS 62 (2004) http://www.sen.ca.gov/sor/
reports/REPORTSBYSUBJ/PUBLICSAFETYJUDICIARY/PATRIOTACTPDE
52. Stephen Wessler, CTR. FOR THE PREVENTION OF HATE VIOLENCE, UNIV. OF SOUTH-
ERN ME., AFTER 9-11: UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT ON MUSLIM COMMUNITIES MAINE: THE
RESPONDING TO SEPTEMBER 11TH PROJECT 6-9, 11 (2002) http://www.cphv.usm.maine.
edu/91 1%20Report.pdf (Commissioned study of 2000 to 2500 Muslims living in Maine
immediately after 9/11 showed that they were made targets of bias and hate crimes perpe-
trated by civilians as well as harassment, surveillance and profiling by officials on the other.
Muslims were made to feel alienation, anxiety and fear, notwithstanding the many gestures
of compassion and good will).
53. Vanzi, supra note 51.
54. Id.
55. Virginia Law, supra note 31.
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As might be expected, popular writings on the Act, like everything
in America post 9/11, have been heavily influenced by an acute concern
with security and tempered with a visceral reaction of patriotism. Dispas-
sionate impact studies and policy analyses of the Act have been influenced
by fierce and fiery partisanship and blind and blinding advocacy, as driven
by entrenched fundamental values and established vested interests.16 Intel-
lectual debates have been determined more by accepted assumptions and
received perspectives than by enlightened theory, discovered evidence and
informed discussion. In practical terms, there was a lot more rhetoric and
propaganda than painstaking investigation and in-depth analysis. As a re-
sult there is more fire than heat, smoke than light.
II. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND MODEL OF ANALYSIS
This Article investigates two major issues: (1) How has the imple-
mentation of the USAPA impacted the Muslim community in the U.S.?;
and (2) What are some of the more salient and lasting implications of
9/11, including the USAPA, on American society?
For the purpose of this research, the following definition or under-
standing of Muslim community is adopted:
'Muslim community' denotes a type of a grouping of people,
where Islam is the decisive common denominator not only in
the religious practice but also in the behavior of the commu-
nity in general. Secularizing tendencies are often inhibited or
reverted by activities of internal findamentalist movements
that advocate obedience to religious prescriptions in everyday
life. As for decision-making, a kind of communalism is preva-
lent, based usually on broader kinship structures. 7
There are many ways to observe, measure, document and evaluate
the impact and implications of the USAPA on society. As with most other
policy analysis research, the observed impact and implications of the
USAPA depends as much on where you look as with whom you ask. For
example,
What kinds of activities, rights or interests were being af-
fected? The USAPA affected many activities, (e.g.
56. David Horowitz, Unholy Alliance: How the Left Supports the Terrorists at Home,
FrontPage Magazine, Sept. 24, 2004, http://www.frontpagemag.com/articles/
Printable.asp?ID=15221.
57. Jan Snaidauf, Major Security Implications of Muslim Communities' Presence in
Western-Type Societies, Association for International Affairs, Prague Security Studies Insti-
tute (May 23,2003) http://www.js.amo.cz/archive/me-islam/PP-MuslimCommun.html.
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research vs. teaching), 8 rights, (e.g. academic freedom 9 vs.
right to free speech 61), and interests, (e.g. legal vs. eco-
nomic) .61
* Who is being affected?6 2 Many people are differently af-
fected by the USAPA, e.g. South Asian Americans, Arab
Americans, Muslim Americans, and look alike "Mus-
lims." 63
" How is the impact being felt? Impact can be felt indi-
vidually as well as collectively, psychologically and
physically, and socially as well as politically.
Finally, and perhaps more significantly, policy and program impact
analysis ultimately depends on the perspective adopted and the frame of
reference used by the evaluator.
" From whose perspective is the impact being evaluated?
(E.g. from the perspective of the administration or of so-
ciety generally)
" With what frame of reference is the impact evaluated?
(E.g. from a security or liberty perspective)
" What is the time frame in evaluating impact? The impact
can be measured in long or short-term.
In this study, I will be looking at the impact of the USAPA from the
Muslim perspective, as representing their personal experience and group
58. David Lombard Harrison, Higher Education Issues After The USA Patriot Act,
University of North Carolina, Office of the President available at http://www.nacua.org/
documents/PatriotActOutline.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2007).
59. Beshara Doumani, ACADEMIC FREEDOM AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 (MIT Press, 2006)
(Kathleen J. FrydI discussed issues surround on the loyalty-oath and free-speech controver-
sies at the University of California. Amy Newhall described the contentious relationship
between universities and the government regarding language acquisition programs. Joel
Beinin raised issues with policing of thought in the academy on Middle East subject mat-
ters.)
60. RESOLUTION ON THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND RELATED MEASURES THAT INFRINGE
ON THE RIGHTS OF LIBRARY USERS, 2002-2003 CD # 20.1 2003 ALA Midwinter Meeting.
http://www.ala.org/ala/washoff/Wissues/civilhberties/theusapatriotact/alaresolution.htm.
61. SR 03-17 Bank Secrecy Act Examination Procedures to the USA PATRIOT
Act (PDF) (Section 313 of USAPA limits banks' economic activity by prohibiting banks
from setting up corresponding accounts for off shore "cell" banks, Section 341 requires
banks to share client information with other banks and law enforcement agencies, this
affects the propriety rights of banks and privacy rights of banking customers) http://
www.ffiec.gov/ffiecinfobase/resources/retail/frb-sr3-17-new-exam-proced-patriot-act.
pdf#search='USA%20PATRIOT%20ACT%20and%20Banking'.
62. Robert Hefner, Remarks on Muslim Politics and U.S. Policies: Prospects for
Pluralism and Democracy in the Muslim World, The Pew Forum on Religion and Public
Life and the Institute on Religion and World Affairs (Sept. 17, 2003).
63. Maira, supra note 33.
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reaction to post 9/11 anti-terrorism measures, specifically those dragnet
anti-terrorism operations, such as operation PENTTBOM and "Special
Registration" programs.
III. POST 9/1I COUNTER-fTRRORISM STRATEGY:
TOTAL INFORMATION CONTROL
A. Post 9/11 Strategy and Tactics
On September 11, 2001, immediately after the attack, the President
of the United States promised that "[t]he United States will hunt down
and punish those responsible for these cowardly acts."64 A day later, on
September 12, 2001, the President declared war on terrorism, pledging,
"[the] United States of America will use all our sources to conquer
this enemy."6 On September 14, 2001, the President, pursuant to the Na-
tional Emergencies Act,6 6 declared that the nation was in a state of
emergency.67 The Attorney General was charged by President Bush with
the responsibility of tracking down the terrorists and protecting the na-
tion from another terrorist attack. President Bush instructed Attorney
General Ashcroft immediately after the 9/11 attacks, "John, make sure this
[9/11-terrorism] can't happen again."6' The Attorney General took the
charge serious and issued this warning:
Let the terrorists among us be warned ... If you overstay your
visa, even by one day, we will arrest you. If you violate a local
law, you will be put in jail and kept in custody as long as possi-
ble. We will use every available statute. We will seek every
prosecutorial advantage. We will use all our weapons within
the law and under the Constitution to protect life and enhance
security for America.
6
1
64. Remarks by the President Upon Arrival at Barksdale Air Force Base (Sept. 11,
2001) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-1.html.
65. Remarks by the President in Photo Opportunity with the National Security
Team (Sept. 12, 2001) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/
09/20010912-4.html.
66. 50 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006).
67. Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks
(Sept. 14, 2001) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/
20010914-4.html.
68. Steven Brill, After: How America Confronted the September 12 Era, 15 (Simon
& Schuster) (2003).
69. Newsmax.com Wires, Ashcroft Eager to Expand Police Powers, http://
www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/10/25/160238.shtml (last visited Oct. 18,
2006).
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Immediately after 9/11, the Attorney General acted to empower
government officials and restrict the rights of the people, in the name of
promoting national security and fighting terrorism." According to the
Attorney General the key to winning the war on terror is information
control, total awareness of the enemy's position, and complete cover-up of
the government's activities. The Attorney General sought and achieved
complete information blackout of DOJ enforcement operations. On Oc-
tober 12, 2001, Ashcroft issued new Administration policy on the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which superseded the Department
of Justice FOIA policy memorandum released in October 1993. The old
FOIA policy was in favor of liberal information release; there was a "pre-
sumption of disclosure" to achieve "maximum possible disclosure."'
Contrary to the former presumption, the new policy favors withholding
information until justified.12 The Ashcroft policy implored the agencies to
release information only after careful consideration of national security,
law enforcement and personal privacy needs. Under the new policy, the
DOJ stands ready to defend against any FOIA request on "sound legal
basis."7 3 Research has shown that since 9/11, the Bush administration has
consistently denied public access to government information based on the
First Amendment or through the FOIA. As observed by Public Citizen, a
national, non-profit consumer advocacy organization:
From the first days of his administration, President Bush has
taken steps to tighten the government's hold on information
and limit public scrutiny of its activities. Expansive assertions
of executive privilege, restrictive views of the Freedom of In-
formation Act, increasing use of national security classification,
70. Insatiable Appetite: The Government's Demand for New and Unnecessary Pow-
ers After September 11, Am. Civ. LIBERTIES UNION REP. (ACLU Washington National
Office), Oct. 15 2002, at 2.
71. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Freedom of Information Act: Agency Views on
Changes Resulting from New Administration Policy, G.A.O Doc. No. 03-981, at 2,4 and
8 (Sept. 2003).
72. See John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney General, Memorandum from Attorney General
John Ashcroft to Heads of All Federal Departments and Agencies on The Freedom of In-
formation Act (Oct. 12, 2001) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/
2001foiapostl9.htm. (This memo was buttressed by another memo calling for reclassifica-
tion of "Previously Unclassified or Declassified Information" and more restrictive release
of "Sensitive But Unclassified Information." Memorandum from Andrew H. Card, Jr.,
Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff to Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies on Action to Safeguard Information Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction
and Other Sensitive Documents Related to Homeland Security (Mar. 19, 2002) available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2002foiapost10.htm).
73. Id. ("When you carefully consider FOIA requests and decide to withhold re-
cords, in whole or in part, you can be assured that the Department ofJustice will defend
your decisions unless they lack a sound legal basis or present an unwarranted risk of ad-
verse impact on the ability of other agencies to protect other important records").
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stonewalling in response to congressional requests for informa-
tion-all these were evident even before the September 11
attacks. Since then, the clamps on information have only tight-
ened. 4
The Bush administration's stance has been supported by sympathetic
courts with an inhospitable attitude toward free access to government
information when national security is at stake, as well as a willingness to
defer to the President in time of war. 5
With the new FOLA policy, the Bush administration is able to keep
much of its anti-terrorism polices and decision-making secret, thus insu-
lating the administration from public accountability and political
consequences. For example, the DOJ successfully withheld "sensitive"
USAPA implementation information from being released, such as the
number, names and whereabouts of people being held by the government,
as well as the frequency, manners and targets for which Section 215
USAPA powers have been used.76 The DOJ justified withholding of in-
formation from public disclosure on the grounds of "mosaic theory,"
which supposes that innocuous pieces of information can be used by ter-
rorists to discover anti-terrorism strategies or tactics.7"
Consistent with Attorney General John Ashcroft's strategy of secrecy,
he refused to release information to the Congress on anti-terrorism
operations and measures. 8 This led Senator Leahy to call for more
cooperation between the legislative and executive branches in fighting the
war on terror:
74. Public Citizen, Bush Secrecy.org, available at http://www.bushsecrecy.org/ (last
visited Nov. 15,2006).
75. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Under Attack: The Public's Right to Know and the War
on Terror 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 34-81, 36 (2005) (discussing President Bush's attitude
and policy toward information control).
76. See, e.g., Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. Dep't ofJustice, 215 E Supp. 2d 94 (D.CC.
2002);Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep't ofJustice, 321 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2004);Am.
Civil Liberties Union and Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep't of Justice, Civil Action No. 05-
845 (D.D.C. April 2005) ("EPIC, joined by the American Civil Liberties Union and li-
brary and booksellers' organizations, filed suit on October 24, 2002 under the FOIA in
seeking the disclosure of information concerning implementation of the controversial
USA PATRIOT Act"); Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep't of Justice, No. 05-845 (D. D.C.
Nov. 16, 2005) (EPIC files a federal complaint forcing the FBI to disclose information
about its use of USAPA investigative powers under the sunset provisions).
77. David E. Pozen, Note, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of In-
formation Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628 (Dec. 2005) (this Note traces the evolution of the "mosaic
theory" in the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) national security jurisprudence. It
observes that after 9/11 the "mosaic theory" was heavily borrowed to justify executive
secrecy and elicit judicial deference).
78. See generally People for the American Way, Two Years After 9/11: Ashcroft's
Assault on the Constitution, Sept. 9, 2003 available at http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/
dfiles/file_232.pdf.
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Attorney General Ashcroft has repeatedly declined to appear
before the Judiciary Committee to answer questions, and his
Department is painfully slow to respond to written requests for
information. To quote my friend Senator Grassley, "getting in-
formation from the Justice Department under Ashcroft is like
pulling teeth." By ignoring oversight requests until answers are
moot or outdated, and responding in only vague and conclu-
sory fashion, if at all, the Justice Department frustrates our
constitutional system of checks and balances, and sows the sort
of public distrust that now accompanies the PATRIOT Act.
79
Along the same vein, the Attorney General resisted public request
and court order for information. In 2002, the Attorney General success-
fully had state and local governments refuse to release names of people
detained since September 11, with the use of the preemption doctrine,
which states that federal law supersedes any state or local claims to the
information."0 In January 2002, the ACLU of New Jersey sued for the
release of ghost detainee's name under the New Jersey right-to-know
law.8 A New Jersey court granted the relief on April 22, 2002.2 Ashcroft
declined to follow state court order.8 3
On September 21, 2001, 10 days after 9/11, Chief Immigration
Judge Michael Creppy issued a memo 4 closing all deportation proceed-
ings to the public and press," if and when it is deemed appropriate to do
79. Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions Congressional Record
Oct. 1, 2003, P. S12278-S12299 available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2003_cr/
s1695.html.
80. Release of Information Regarding Immigration and Naturalization Service
Detainees in Non-Federal Facilities, 67 Fed. Reg. 19, 508 (Proposed Apr. 22, 2002) (to be
codified at 8 C.FR. pts. 236 and 241).
81. NJ. high court won't hear appeal on releasing detainees' names ASSOCIATED
PRsss, July 10, 2002. (The N.J. Supreme refused to hear appeal of state appellate court
decision to allow the federal government to withhold name of 9/11 detainees held in N.J.
state prison).
82. Am. Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey v. County of Hudson, 352 NJ. Super.
44 (2002).
83. 67 Fed. Reg. 19, 508 supra.note 79.
84. Memorandum from Michael Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge on Cases Re-
quiring Special Procedures and with Instructions for Cases Requiring Additional Security
to All Immigration Judges (Sept. 21, 2001) available at http://files.findlaw.com/
news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/aclu/creppy092101memo.pdf.
The Chief Immigration Judge's authority in this case is derived from 8 U.S.C. S
1103(a) (1994) (Under the Immigration and Nationality Act the Attorney General has the
responsibility for "administration and enforcement" of "all laws relating to the immigration
and naturalization of aliens." The Act authorizes the Attorney General to prescribe "such
regulations ... as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority").
85. Id. (In designated "special interest" cases there is supposed to be complete
blackout of information. The immigration judge is authorized "to close the hearing[s] to
the public, and to avoid discussing the case[s] or otherwise disclosing any information
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so and as directed by DOJ in "special interest cases."I 6 The designation of
"special interest""7 is summarily made with no input from the detainees
and cannot be appealed. The need for a special Creppy Memo procedural
hearing is based on two justifications: 1)Avoiding setback to the terrorism
investigation, e.g. disclosure might reveal focus, direction or progress of
the investigation and 2) Protecting detainees from harm or stigma, e.g.
disclosure might subject detainee to harm or intimidation and prevent
him/her from cooperating. The Creppy Memo was challenged by the
ACLU in Detroit Free Press, v. Ashcroft,18 filed in U.S. District Court in the
Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division.89 "The primary issue on
appeal in this case, is whether the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution confers a public right of access to deportation hearings. If it
does, then the Government must make a showing to overcome that
right."90
B. Total Information Awareness
As the Attorney General John Ashcroft was restricting access to the
federal government anti-terrorism effort, he was seeking more and more
information on the terrorists, through Total Information Awareness
(TIA)91  and the Terrorism Information and Prevention System
(TIPS).92 Even the established attorney-client privilege or Constitutional
about the case[s] to anyone outside the Immigration Court ... [t]he courtroom must be
closed for these cases-no visitors, no family, and no press ... [this] includes confirming or
denying whether such a case is on the docket or scheduled for a hearing").
86. Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy in the Immigration Courts and Beyond: Considering the Right
To Know in the Administrative State, 39 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 95 (2004).
87. North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), (According
to Dale L.Watson, the FBI's Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and Coun-
terintelligence, "special interest" cases involved aliens who "might have connections with,
or possess information pertaining to, terrorist activities against the United States").
88. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F Supp. 2d 937,946 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
89. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F3d 681, 682 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Amy E.
Hooper, Investigation Terrorism: The Role of the First Amendment, 2004 Duke L. & Tech. Rev.
0002 (providing a historical context of the case) http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/
dltr/articles/PDF/2004DLTR0002.pdf.
90. Detroit Free Press, supra note 88, at 945.
91. American Civil Liberties Union, Q&A on the Pentagon's "Total Information
Awareness" Program, (Apr. 20, 003) available at http://www.aclu.org/privacy/spying/
15578res20030420.html (TIA is run by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) at the Department of Defense. TIA collects as much information as possible
about as many people as possible and compiles it into an "ultra-large-scale" database in
order to identify terrorists by discerning patterns of activities and discovering linkages in
relationships).
92. Nat Hentoff, Ashcroft's Master Plan to Spy on Us, THEVILLAGEVOICE, Aug. 2, 2002,
http://www.villagevoice.com/news/0232,hentoff,37174,6.html (The Terrorism Informa-
tion and Prevention System sought to recruit a million letter carriers, meter readers, cable
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privacy was considered no obstacle to the Attorney General's hunt for
information. Thus, on October 31, 2001, the Department of Justice pub-
lished a new regulation, 28 C.FR. § 501.3(d), authorizing the Bureau of
Prisons (BOP) to monitor communications between prisoner detainees
and their lawyers without obtaining a court order. This rule applied to all
detainees, irrespective of the alleged crime and stage of legal proceeding.
The rule grants the Attorney General the authority to listen in on attor-
ney-client communication if there is "reasonable suspicion" that a person
in custody "may" use communications with attorneys or their agents "to
further or facilitate acts of terrorism."'93 The Justice Department "shall ...
provide appropriate procedures for the monitoring or review of commu-
nications between that inmate and attorneys or attorneys' agents who are
traditionally covered by the attorney-client privilege."94 Except in court
ordered cases, the BOP "shall provide written notice to the inmate and to
the attorneys involved, prior to the initiation of any monitoring or re-
view," that "all communications between the inmate and attorneys may be
monitored, to the extent determined to be reasonably necessary for the
purpose of deterring future acts of violence or terrorism."" This rule was
a radical departure from an established Constitutional rule.96 The rule un-
dermined existing legal professional ethical norms97 and attracted scorn
technicians, and other workers with access to private homes as informants to report to the
Justice Department any activities they think suspicious).
93. 28 C.ER. §§ 500-501; see National Security; Prevention of Acts ofViolence and
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 55062 (October 31, 2001); see also Eavesdropping on Attorney-
Client Communications, Friends Committee on National Legislation, Dec. 20, 2001,
http://www.fcnl.org/issues/itemprint.php?item-id=265&issue-id=69.
94. 28 C.FR. § 501.3(d) (October 31, 2001).
95. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d)(3) (October 31, 2001) (discussing that limited privilege is
allowed. The Department "shall employ appropriate procedures to ensure that all attorney-
client communications are reviewed for privilege claims and that any properly privileged
materials . .. are not retained during the course of the monitoring." Review is conducted
by a "privilege team." "Except in cases where the person in charge of the privilege team
determines that acts of violence or terrorism are inminent, the privilege team shall not
disclose any information unless and until such disclosure has been approved by a federal
judge").
96. Coplon v. U. S., 191 E2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (monitoring of conversations
between detainees and their attorneys denies the accused of their constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel); Hoffa v. U. S., 385 U.S. 293, 306 (1966) (affirming holding
in Coplon); Shillinger v. Hayworth, 70 E3d 1132, 1141 (10th Cir. 1995) (Sixth Amend-
ment protects against intentional intrusion into attorney-client relationship).
97. See generally DR 1-103 [1200.4] Disclosure of Information to Authorities,
New York Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility, http://www.law.cornell.edu/
ethics/ny/code/NYCODE.HTM.
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from civil rights advocates,98 legislators,99 lawyers," and a variety of public
interest groups."'
After 9/11 the Attorney General, DOJ, FBI, and NSA mounted the
largest surveillance program in the nation to track down terrorists and
prevent another attack."°2 Most of the effort has been directed towards the
Muslim community and has been spurred by ethnic considerations.
In 2002, building upon the community policing framework and
National Neighborhood Watch Program,1"3 Attorney General John
Ashcroft announced the creation of the Terrorism Information and Pre-
vention System (TIPS).1 14 The program asked citizens and recruited
informants to spy on their neighbors, report on their friends and look
over the shoulder of everyone.105 Those who were recruited include: letter
carriers, utility employees, truck drivers and train conductors, i.e. those
who have routine contact, unimpeded access and privileged information
to homes, businesses, transport systems, and databases. The pilot program
98. See National Lawyers Guild, Written Comment by the Mass Chapter to a Final
Rule of the AG Authorizing the Monitoring of Communication Between Detainees and
their Attorneys Without a Warrant (Dec. 22, 2001) http://nlgmass.org/events/
news0202.htm1#eavesdrop.
99. See Patrick Leahy, U.S. Senator, Letter to Attorney General John Ashcroft,
'Deeply Troubled' About Monitoring Of Conversations Between Detainees And Their
Attorneys; Asks Answers From Attorney General Ashcroft, Office of U.S. Senator
Patrick Leahy (November 9, 2001) available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200111/
110901.html.
100. See Robert J. Anello, Justice Under Attack: The Federal Government's Assault
on the Attorney-Client Privilege, Cardozo Pub. L. Pol'y Ethics J. 1 (2003) (Anello was
Chairman of the Committee on Professional Responsibility of the Association of the Bar
of the City of NewYork).
101. American Civil Liberties Union, Coalition Comments Regarding Eavesdrop-
ping on Confidential Attorney-Client Communications (Dec. 20, 2001) available at
http://www.aclu.org/crimjustice/gen/10088leg200l1220.html.
102. Lowell Bergman, Post-9/11 Tips to FBI Often Led to Dead Ends: NSA Forwarded
Flood of Eavesdropping Data, San Diego Union Tribune, Jan. 17, 2006, http://www.
signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20060117/news1nl17nsa.html.
103. ATTORNEY GENERAL ASHCROFT ANNOUNCES NEIGHBORHOOD
WATCH CAMPAIGN, Press Release, Department ofJustice, March 6,2002 ("The Attorney
General announced a grant of $1.9 million ... to double the number of National
Neighborhood Watch programs over the next two years ... to enhance local homeland
security efforts and make preparedness a part of our daily lives") available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/March/02_ag_125.htm.
104. See American Library Association,Terrorism Information and Prevention System
(TIPS), (providing a documentary archive of TIPS) http://www.ala.org/ala/oif/
ifissues/terrorisminformationprevention.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2006).
105. Ritt Goldstein, US planning to recruit one in 24 Americans as citizen
spies, SMH.com.au, July 15, 2002, http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/07/14/
1026185141232.htnl.
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as announced on the government website, www.citizencorps.gov,' °6 was
to be started in August 2002 with the government recruiting 1 million
informants in ten cities. This amounted to one in twenty-four people in
those cities turning into government spies. As described on the website,
TIPS is "a nationwide program giving millions of American truckers, let-
ter carriers, train conductors, ship captains, utility employees, and others a
formal way to report suspicious terrorist activity."" 7 As designed the TIPS
program involved a million workers, who, "in the daily course of their
work, are in a unique position to serve as extra eyes and ears for law en-
forcement." TIPS volunteers will receive "training ... in how to look out
for suspicious and potentially terrorist-related activity ... [and] a formal
way to report [that activity] through a single and coordinated toll-free
number."''0 The TIPS program was also linked to the FOX television pro-
gram "America's Most Wanted.""°
Tom Ridge, the Secretary of Homeland Security, defended the TIPS
program, noting that the civilians "might pick up a break in the certain
rhythm or pattern of a community. They may pick up in the course of
their daily business something that's very unusual""0 It was not intended
for "Americans spying on Americans." '
The TIPS program received mixed review from the public; some
deemed it essential to fight terror,"' others thought it reminiscent of the
state of government in 1984,"3 still others considered it incompatible
with their professional status and responsibilities. If our experience with
the immediate aftermath of 9/11 is any guide, TIPS would have resulted
in selective attention, discriminatory reporting, if not even racial bias.
What is "unfamiliar "suspicious" or "not normal" is quite often a mere
figment of one's imagination.
106. See Citizen Corps, Neighborhood Watch Program, http://www.citizencorps.gov/
programs/watch.shtm (last visited Oct. 18, 2006) (The site no longer contains information
on TIPS, but references the importance of the Neighborhood Watch program after 9/11).
107. See American Library Association, supra note 104.
108. Why-war.com, "hat Is Operation TIPS?, WASHINGTON PosT,July 14, 2002, avail-
able at http://www.why-war.com/news/2002/07/14/whatisop.html.
109. Dave Lindorff, Analysis: When Neighbors Attack!, SALON, Aug. 6, 2002,
http://www.why-war.com/news/2002/08/06/whenneig.html#terrorisminformation_
prevention.system.
110. DOJgov.net, Justice Department Prepares Citizen Watch. USD0J registered postal
workers, plumbers, police and painters ... spying on you in your home, July 19, 2002, http://
www.dojgov.net/TIPS-01 .htm.
111. Id.
112. Liza Porteus, Labor Union Supports Bush TIPS Plan, Fox NEws, Aug. 7, 2002,
http://www.why-war.com/news/2002/08/07/laboruni.html.
113. Daniel Kurtzman, Bush Channels Onvell, S.F CHRONICLE, July 28, 2002, http://
www.why-war.com/news/2002/07/28/bushchan.html. See also GEORGE ORWELL, 1984
(Penguin Books 1961) (1949) (1984 depicts in vivid detail how totalitarian government
and national security state operates).
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While the TIPS program never materialized, the intent of the Ad-
ministration was made clear, and its rhetoric became reality: Big Brother is
around the corner and here to stay. Government spokesman repeatedly
warned people to: "watch what you say.''
1 4
In order to be able to predict and prevent terrorism, the Bush ad-
ministration, from the DOJ to NSA, has resorted to "data mining"
techniques and programs to keep track of terrorist activities. " ' Data min-
ing, the ability to use computer programs and statistical modeling to
uncover hidden patterns and subtle relationships, has long existed and was
widely used in the commercial world to discern consumer taste or market
trends. It has since been adopted by the government for a variety of pur-
poses. A survey of 28 government agencies (with 12 responding) in 2004,
revealed that the government has engaged in 199 data mining operations,
of which 122 involve personal information. The top six purposes for
which data mining of personal information is used are: increasing tax
compliance (7 data mining efforts), to collecting terrorist intelligence (10),
managing human resources (15), detecting criminals (15), uncovering
fraud, waste and abuse (24), and improving services (33).116
One such counter-terrorism data mining program is the Total In-
formation Awareness Program (TIA), operated under the Information
Awareness Office (IAO) at the Defense Advance Research Agency
(DARPA).1 1 7 The first director of IOA was Adm. John Poindexter, former
United States National Security Advisor to President Ronald Reagan.'
In fiscal year 2003, IOA started to fund research and development of the
Total Information Awareness (TIA) Program. The TIA's function and ca-
pabilities have been described in the following manner:
114. Reacting to Bill Maher's comments that terrorists are not cowards, but members
of the U.S. Armed Forces are, the White House Press Secretary, Mr. Fleischer warned that
these remarks are "reminders to all Americans that they need to watch what they say,
watch what they do. This is not a time for remarks like that; there never is." White-
House.gov, Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer, Sept. 26, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2001/09/20010926-5.html#BillMaher-Comments.
115. EAVESDROPPING 101: WHAT CAN THE NSA DO? NSA Watch-ACLU
(n.d.) http://www.nsawatch.org/eaveslOl.html.
116. United States General Accounting Office, Data Mining: Federal Efforts Cover a
Wide Range of Uses (2004), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04548.pdf.
117. The IAO seeks to devise innovative and technologically sophisticated ways to
analyze data. John Poindexter, Overview of the Information Awareness Office, DAR-
PATech 2002 Conference, Anaheim, Calif., Aug. 2, 2002, http://www.fas.org/irp/
agency/dod/poindexter.html ("I think the solution [to asymmetric warfare, including
terrorism] is largely associated with information technology. We must become much more
efficient and more clever in the ways we find new sources of data, mine information from
the new and old, generate information, make it available for analysis, convert it to knowl-
edge, and create actionable options").
118. John Markoff, Chief Takes Over at Agency to Thwart Attacks on US., N.Y TIMaS,
Feb. 13, 2002, at A27.
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The TIA program sought to develop information technology
in three areas. Those areas are language translation, data search
with pattern recognition and privacy protection, and advanced
collaborative and decision support tools. Language translation
technology would enable the rapid analysis of foreign lan-
guages, both spoken and written, and allow analysts to quickly
search the translated materials for clues about emerging threats.
The data search, pattern recognition, and privacy protection
technologies would permit analysts to search vast quantities of
data for patterns that suggest terrorist activity while at the
same time controlling access to the data, enforcing laws and
policies, and ensuring detection of misuse of the information
obtained. The collaborative reasoning and decision support
technologies would allow analysts from different agencies to
share data. 19
In May 2003, the TIA program was renamed the Terrorism Infor-
mation Awareness Program for political reasons.1 20 The ultimate objective
is to predict, preempt and interdict terrorist activities. Very rapidly TIA
came to represent the problems with President Bush's Big Brother ap-
proach to counter-terrorism. Congress stopped funding the project, and
Poindexter resigned in August of 2003.121 While the TIA program never
got beyond the laboratory stage, the ideas behind it were sufficient to rat-
tle a nation skeptical of the intent, and frightened about the prospect, of a
government bent on keeping anything and everyone under electronic
surveillance.122
119. GlobalSecurityorg, Total Information Awareness (TIA): Terrorism Information
Awareness (TIA), http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/systems/tia.htm (last visited
Oct. 18, 2006).
120. Report to Congress regarding the Terrorism Information Awareness Program, May
20, 2003, http://www.information-retrieval.info/docs/tia-exec-summ_20may2003.pdf.
121. Bradley Graham, Poindexter Resigns but Defends Programs; Anti-Terrorism, Data
Scanning Efforts at Pentagon Called Victims of Ignorance, THE WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 13,
2003,A02, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A51578-2003Aug12.
122. Scott Berinato, The Short Life, Public Execution and (Secret) Resurrection of Total
Information Awareness, CSO ONLINE, August 10, 2004, http://www.csoonline.com/
read/080104/poindexter.html. ("Was it an Orwellian nightmare or an intelligence savior?
John Poindexter says TIA was sucked into a vortex of politics and knee-jerk foolishness
before anyone could answer that question").
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C. Government as "Big Brother"--FBI Intelligence
Gathering Operations
On May 30, 2002, the Attorney General's Guidelines on General
Crimes, Racketeering and Terrorism ("Guidelines")12 3 were released to
the public. 124 The Guidelines revised pre-existing guidelines by former
Attorney Generals. The 2002 version was a sharp departure from the
Guidelines of the 1970s (Levi Guidelines)2 ' and the 1980s (Reno Guide-
lines).1 26 The new Guidelines allow the FBI to monitor political groups
without suspicion of any criminal or terrorist activities. As a result, the
FBI may go on a fishing expedition and listen in to intimate conversation
or watch over the private conduct of lawful citizens. Worse yet, the
Guidelines allows the FBI to monitor political dissidents and advocacy
groups, at will.
The Guidelines also allow for "full investigation" to gather criminal
intelligence "concerning the nature and structure of the enterprise-
including information relating to the group's membership, finances, geo-
graphical dimensions, past and future activities, and goals-with a view
toward detecting, preventing, and prosecuting the enterprise's criminal
activities. ' 27 Furthermore,
[A]terrorism enterprise investigation may be initiated when
facts or circumstances reasonably indicate 128 that two or more
persons are engaged in an enterprise for the purpose of
(i)furthering political or social goals wholly or in part through
activities that involve force or violence and a violation of federal
criminal law, (ii)engaging in terrorism as defined in 18 U.S.C.
2331(1) or (5) that involves a violation of federal criminal law
123. The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enter-
prise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations, May 30, 2002, http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/
generalcrimes2.pdf.
124. David Johnson & Don Van Natta Jr., Ashcroft Weighs Erasing FBI Limits for Surveil-
lance. Seeking to Free FBI to Spy on Groups, ThE N.Y.TMEs, Dec. 1, 2001 atA2.
125. Guidelines by Attorney General Edward Levi on Domestic Intelligence, March
1976, available at Statutory Charter: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the Judici-
ary, 95th Cong. pt. 1, 20-26 (1978) (hereafter "1978 Senate Hearings on FBI Statutory
Charter Part r') and in FBI Oversight: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong.
181-87 (1978).
126. Electronic Privacy Information Center, The Attorney General's Guidelines,
http://www.epic.org/privacy/fbi/ (last visited Oct. 18,2006).
127. The Attorney General's Guidelines, supra note 123.
128. The "reasonable indication" threshold for undertaking such an investigation is
substantially lower than probable cause.
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or (iii) committing any offense described in 18 U.S.C.
2332b(g) (5)(B). n9
In practical terms, the "reasonable indication" standard for opening a
criminal intelligence investigation of an enterprise in the terrorism con-
text could be satisfied in a number of ways. While no particular factor or
combination of factors is required, considerations that will generally be
relevant to the determination of whether the threshold standard for a ter-
rorism enterprise investigation is satisfied are a group's statements, its
activities, and the nature of potential federal criminal law violations sug-
gested by its statements or activities, including:
(1) Threats or advocacy of violence or other covered crimi-
nal acts ...
(2) Apparent ability or intent to carry out violence or other
covered activities ...
(i) By acquiring, or taking steps towards acquiring,
biological agents or toxins, toxic chemicals ... or
other destructive or dangerous materials (or plans
or formulas for such materials), or weapons, under
circumstances where, by reason of the quantity or
character of the items, the lawful purpose of the ac-
quisition is not apparent;
(ii) By the creation, maintenance, or support of an
armed paramilitary organization;
(iii) By paramilitary training; or
(iv) By other conduct demonstrating an apparent ability
or intent to injure or intimidate individuals, or to
interfere with the exercise of their constitutional or
statutory rights. "'
The Guidelines allow the FBI to look into any individual or organi-
zation that the FBI considers to be subversive or dangerous, or professes
ideas different from the administration, such as anti-war protestors who
advocate civil disobedience.
Under the Guidelines, FBI agents can attend public meetings, visit
houses of worship, listen in on chats, download information from message
boards, and purchase commercial data mining information. Specifically,
the Introduction to the Guidelines enumerates:
129. III. Criminal Intelligence Investigation (B)(1)(a) General Authority, The
Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and
Terrorism Enterprise Investigations, 15, May 30, 2002, http://wwv.usdoj.gov/olp/
generalcrimes2.pdf.
130. Id. at 4-5.
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(ii) Visiting places and events which are open to the public
for the purpose or detecting or preventing terrorist ac-
tivities (VI.A(2));
(iii) Carrying out general topical research, such as searching
online under terms like "anthrax" or "smallpox" to obtain
publicly available information about agents that may be
used in bioterrorism attacks (VI.B(1));
(iv) Surfing the Internet as any member of the public might
do to identify, e.g., public websites, bulletin boards, and
chat rooms in which bomb making instructions, child
pornography, or stolen credit card information is openly
traded or disseminated, and observing information open
to public view in such forums to detect terrorist activities
and other criminal activities (VI.B(2)). 1
The FBI's unlimited surveillance and monitoring of political speech
has also been abused. For example, The FBI Interviewed San Franciscan
Barry Reingold after he made remarks in his local gym that "Bush has
nothing to be proud of. He is a servant of the big oil companies and his
only interest in the Middle East is oil." 13 Subsequently, two agents
showed up at his home. 133 After the agents assured him he was entitled to
freedom of speech, Reingold said "Thank you. That ends our conversa-
tion." 131 When Reingold closed his door, he heard one of the agents say,
"But we still need to do a report."135
131. Id. at 6.
132. Kris Axtman, Political Dissent Can Bring Federal Agents to Door, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Jan. 8, 2002, http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0108/pls4-usju.html.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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IV. POST 9/11 COUNTER-TERRORISM OPERATIONS DRAGNET AND
PREVENTIVE DETENTION
A. FBI "special interest" dragnet'36
The campaign against domestic terrorism started immediately after
9/11.13' The FBI launched the PENTTBOM or "Pentagon/Twin Towers
Bombing" to investigate the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York
and Washington, D.C. In time, PENTTBOM would become the largest
criminal investigation in U.S. history.'38
In 2003, after an extensive internal investigation, the Office of the
Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of Justice (DOJ) released its
audit report on the FBI's post 9/11 investigation effort and its impact on
civil rights. The report was entitled, "The September 11 Detainees: A Re-
view of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in
136. Laura W Murphy & Timothy H. Edgar, ACLU Testimony on "Immigration
Enforcement Since September 11, 2001" before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on
Immigration, Border Security and Claims, ACLU, May 8, 2003, http://www.aclu.org/
safefree/general/17298leg20030508.htm (shortly after 9/11 the DOJ, as instructed by
Attorney General Ashcroft, launched a "massive preventive detention" campaign with the
use of immigrant charges as a pretext and afforded few legal rights, process, resource and
relief to investigative subjects. "Under new Department of Justice policies, immigrants
today can be arrested and held in secret for a lengthy period without charge, denied re-
lease on bond without effective recourse, and have their appeals dismissed following
cursory or no review. They can be subjected to special, discriminatory registration proce-
dures involving fingerprinting and lengthy questioning concerning their religious and
political views. An immigrant spouse who is abused by her husband must fear deportation
if she calls the local police. Asylum-seekers fleeing repressive regimes like those of the Tali-
ban or Saddam Hussein may face mandatory detention, without any consideration of their
individual circumstances").
137. As of September 14, 2001 the FBI had assigned 4,000 special agents and 3,000
support staff to the 9/11 investigation, and had processed 36,000 leads; of which more
than 30,000 were received via the Internet, 3,800 were called in, and 2,400 were gener-
ated by field offices. The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, September 11, 2001: Attack on
America Attorney General and FBI Director News Conference; Sept. 14, 2001,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/sept_ 1/ashcroft briefing04.htm.
138. Dan Eggen, FBI's 9/11 Team Still Hard at Work: Dwindling Group Wants to See
Probe Through to the End, WASHINGTON POST, June 14, 2004, at A01, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A39160-2004Jun13?language=printer
("Originally numbering more than 70 people, the team chased more than a quarter-
million leads in the months after the attacks, dispatching thousands of FBI agents world-
wide") (the PENTTBOM interviewed 180,000 people and reviewed millions of pages of
documents); see The "PEN7TBOM" Investigation, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-srv/nation/daily/graphics/penttbom_061404.html (summarizing PENTTBOM in-
vestigative activities; see also Criminal Complaints & Indictments, FoxNews.com,
http://www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf/112801_complaints.pdf (listing PENTTBOM
and related detentions, criminal complaints and indictments).
[VOL. 12:161
The USA Patriot Act
Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks."'' 39 This is
one of the most comprehensive reports conducted by the DOJ on prob-
lems with the implementation of post 9/11 anti-terrorism measures. The
investigation benefited from Congressional authority and internal access
to sources and information. The report was based on systematic and ex-
tensive examination of government records and interview of government
officials at different levels, e.g. FBI field office supervisors and street FBI
agents, and at many enforcement agencies, e.g. BOP, FBI, INS.
The report made the following findings about the PENTTBOM
investigation:
(1) In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the FBI
launched the PENTTBOM investigation. Many people
(of Middle East extraction) were detained as material
witnesses or persons of interests based on no more than
their ethnicity, association with terrorists or just anony-
mous clues, e.g. reports of suspicious Arab and Muslim
neighbors who kept odd schedules. 10
(2) If the arrested persons were of interest, they would be
placed on the INS Custody list as September 11 detain-
ees. They would remain in that status until being cleared
by the FBI, under the "hold until clear policy."They were
not allowed to be on bond. They were not allowed to be
removed by the INS or depart voluntarily.''
(3) "September 11 detainees did not receive notice of the
charges against them in a timely manner ... We found
that the INS served only 60 percent of the September 11
detainees with NTAs within its goal of 72 hours. Many
detainees did not receive their charging documents for
weeks, and some for more than a month, after being ar-
rested.'
'14 2
(4) The FBI was under-resourced. The FBI only cleared less
than 3 percent of the 762 September 11 detainees within
139. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Office of the Inspector Gen., The September 11 Detainees:A
Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the
Investigation of the September 11 Attacks (2003) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/
special/0306/full.pdf (hereinafter Office of the Inspector Gen. I); see also U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Office of the Inspector Gen., "Supplemental Report on September 11 Detainees'
Allegations of Abuse at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York"
(2003)available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0312/index.htm.
140. Office of the Inspector Gen. I, at 16-17.
141. Id. at 18, 25, 37-71.
142. Id. at 29.
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3 weeks of their arrest, the average "hold until clear"
lasted 80 days, and 25% took 3 months or more. 143
(5) The September 11 detainees were treated harshly, inhu-
manely and abusively while in detention at the NYC
Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC). First, the
BOP imposed a total communications blackout at MDC
for weeks. " ' Second, BOP used "Witness Security" clas-
sification to restrict access to information about them,
including their identity, location, and status-No one
knew of their existence and whereabouts.'46 Third, de-
tainees were placed in total isolation and subjected to
cells lighted for 24 hours a day."' 7 Fourth, "the evidence
showed a pattern of physical and verbal abuse by some
correctional officers at the MDC against some Septem-
ber 11 detainees, particularly during the first months after
the attacks and during intake and movement of prison-
ers.''
48
(6) Most of the September 11 detainees did not have timely
and competent legal representation before and during
their MDC stay.149 MDC misled the detainees in their ef-
fort to obtain representation.' Further complicating the
detainees' efforts to obtain counsel, the lists of pro bono
attorney provided to the September 11 detainees con-
tained inaccurate and outdated information.' As a result,
detainees often used their sole legal call during the week
to try to contact one of the legal representatives on the
pro bono list, only to find that the attorney either had
changed their telephone number or did not handle the
particular type of immigration situation faced by the de-
tainees.'
5 2
Subsequently, the DOJ, FBI and INS launched four successive waves
of investigative/enforcement operations, all of which targeted the Muslim
communities as possible threats to U.S. security. Many innocent and law
abiding Muslims were caught up in the "dragnet" by happenstance, mis-
143. Id. at 51-52.
144. Id. at 142.
145. Id. at 112-115.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 153.
148. Id. at 142.
149. Id. at 132.
150. Id. at 134.
151. Id. at 135.
152. Id.
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takes, incompetence, neglect, zealotry, and discrimination. For example, on
December 17, 2001, Abdallah Higazy, an Egyptian engineer graduate stu-
dent, was arrested for having information to or being involved in the
9/11 attack by the FBI."3 The FBI arrested him as a result of having a
pilot's radio in his hotel room, which was left there by the prior resident.
Though Abdallah volunteered and passed the lie detection test, the FBI
continued to interrogate him coercively and without the presence of a
lawyer.' A second example involves three Middle Eastern men stopped
by the New York Police Department for a traffic violation on September
15, 2001.' They were found with construction plans to a public school.
Later, it was confirmed that they worked at the school and had authority
and reason to be carrying the plans. Nevertheless, the men were subjected
to a prolonged detention under the auspices of September 11.1"
B. Attorney General "Special Registration" Program
5 7
Shortly after 9/11 and until December 2003, the DOJ and INS
launched a nation-wide program, The National Security Entry and Exit
Registry System (NSEERS),"' in order to screen and track non-
immigrants 9 who posed increased national security risks. The INS sought
new special registration rules on June 1, 2002.160 The strategic aim of the
Bush administration and the DOJ was to utilize every resources at their
disposal, in this case immigration law, to weed out suspect terrorists,
through preventive detention and deportation. 161 As Ashcroft made clear
in a post 9/11 anti-terrorism policy speech:
153. In re Material Witness Warrant, 214 F Supp. 2d 356, 358 (S.D.N.Y 2002).
154. Human Rts. Watch, Presumption of Guilt: Human Rights Abuses of Post-
September 11 Detainees 37 n. 133 (2002), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/
2002/us9l 1/USA0802.pdf.
155. Regarding Overseeing Impact of Antiterrorism Initiatives on Immigrant Communities:
Hearing Before the N Y City Council Comm. On Immigration (2004) (testimony of Udi Ofer,
Attorney, N.Y. Civil Liberties Union) available at http://www.nyclu.org/antiterror-
_initiatives_testimony_021704.html.
156. Id.
157. Nora V. Demleitner, Misguided prevention: The War on Terrorism as a War on Immi-
grant Offenders and Immigration Violators, 40 No. 6 CalM. L. BULL. 2 (2004).
158. Louise Cainkar, Targeting Muslims, at Ashcroft's Discretion, MIDDLE EAST REPORT
ONINE, Mar. 14, 2003, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero031403.htm.
159. Id. (NSEERS requirements applied only to certain non-immigrant aliens. It did
not apply to U.S. citizens, lawiful permanent residents, refugees, asylum applicants (Who
filed before November 22, 2002), asylum grantees, and diplomats or others admitted under
A or G visas).
160. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Serv., Department ofJustice
Proposes New Rule for Nonimmigrant Aliens (2002), available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/
rls/fs/2002/11409.htm.
161. David Cole, The Priority of Morality: The Emergency Constitution's Blind Spot, 113
YALE L.J. 1753, 1755 (2004) (arguing against emergency regulations and suspension of
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We have modeled our tactics after a previous Justice Depart-
ment fighting a different threat in this same nation. The Justice
Department of Robert F Kennedy, it was said, would arrest a
mobster for spitting on the sidewalk if it would help in the
fight against organized crime. In the war on terror, it is the
policy of this Department of Justice to be equally aggressive in
protecting Americans. We will arrest and detain any suspected
terrorist who has violated our laws. Suspects without links to
terrorism or who are not guilty of violations of the law will
not be detained. But terrorists who are in violation of the law
will be convicted; in some cases they'll be deported; in all cases
they'll be prevented from doing further harm to Americans.162
The purported reasons for a new registration system are as follows:
Deploy a pilot entry-exit program as quickly as possible, focus-
ing on aliens who present the highest risk of involvement in
terrorist organizations.
Disrupt the activities of terrorists residing in the United States
under false pretenses.
Notify the FBI and other law enforcement agencies when
aliens purporting to visit the United States for legitimate rea-
sons deviate from their stated plans.
Notify the FBI and other law enforcement agencies when
aliens overstay the terms of their non-immigrant visas.
Match the fingerprints of high-risk aliens entering against the
fingerprints of known or suspected terrorists at the port of en-
try.
Obtain fingerprint and photograph data on aliens from high-
risk countries for law enforcement use.
Obtain current address, telephone, and email information on
aliens from high-risk countries.
constitution); see also Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YA L.J. 1029
(2004) (arguing against emergency regulations at the expense of constitutional protection).
162. Attorney Gen. Ashcroft, Announcement of Reorganization of the Nation's Jus-
tice and Law Enforcement Resources (Nov. 8, 2001) available at http://www.fas.org/
irp/news/2001 /11/ag-1 10801.html.
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Enforce the law requiring aliens to notify the Attorney Gen-
eral when they change address.'63
The program collected detailed information about the background
and purpose of an individual's visit to the United States, periodic verifica-
tion of their location and activities, and departure confirmation. The
Department of Homeland Security has justified the NSEERS on the fol-
lowing grounds:
(1) NSEERS allows the United States to run the fingerprints
of aliens who may present elevated national security concerns
against a database of wanted criminals and known terrorists;
164
(2) NSEERS enables DHS to determine instantly when such
an alien has overstayed his visa, which was the case with three
of the 9/11 hijackers);1 61 (3) NSEERS enables DHS to verify
that an alien in the United States on a temporary visa is doing
what he said he would be doing, and living where he said he
would live.
166
In 1996, Congress mandated the development of a comprehensive
entry-exit program by 2005. Before 9/11, a registration system existed in
name only. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, it is the duty of
any alien over 14 years old who remains in the United States more than
30 days to be registered and fingerprinted (INA section 262). Under cur-
rent law (INA section 263), the Attorney General can require the
registration and fingerprinting of any class of aliens, other than those ad-
mitted for permanent residence. In most cases, the regulations have
waived the fingerprinting requirements. Current regulations have limited
registration to aliens from Iraq, Iran, Sudan and Libya.
1 67
Under NSEERS, aliens were first registered and fingerprinted at the
port-of-entry They were then required to re-register after 30 days, and
annually thereafter. On December 1, 2003, the Department of Homeland
163. U.S. Dep't of State, National Security Entry-Exit Registration System: System de-
signed to protect US. citizens from terrorism, (2002) available at http://usinfo.state.gov/is/
ArchiveIndex/EntryExitRegistration_.System.html.
164. Department of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet: Changes to National Security En-
try/Exit Registration System (NSEERS), (Dec. 1, 2003), http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/
display?theme=43&content=3020.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. "Section 262(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ('INA') (8 U.S.C.
130 2 (a)) provides that all aliens who are age 14 or older and who have not previously
been registered and fingerprinted at a consular office abroad, pursuant to section 221(b) of
the INA (8 U.S.C. 1201(b)) or sections 30 or 31 of the Alien Registration Act, 1940, have
a duty to apply for registration and to be fingerprinted if they remain in the United States
for 30 days or longer." Registration and Monitoring of Certain Nonimmigrants from
Designated Countries, 67 Fed. Reg. 57, 032 (Sept. 6, 2002).
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Security suspended '68 the NSEERS automatic re-registration requirement
that mandated aliens to re-register after 30 days and after one year.'69 In-
stead, the DHS has the discretion to ask for continuing registration in
specific cases. Foreign students and visiting scholars who change address
or educational institution through Student and ExchangeVisitor Informa-
tion System (SEVIS) constitute a notification for the purposes of
NSEERS registration.
As operated, the NSEERS program'70 targeted citizens and nationals
from Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, Eritrea, Indonesia,
Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Lebanon, Morocco, North Korea, Oman,
Pakistan, Qatar, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United
Arab Emirates, andYemen, though others have been involved.
Between November 5, 2002 and September 30, 2003 the NSEERS
conducted a total of 290,526 registrations and registered a total of
177,260 people, i.e. 207,007 registrations (93,741 individuals) at the
points of entry, and 83,519 individuals at the former INS offices. The total
number of notices to appear issued was 13,799, of which 1 in 5 (20.79%)
or 2,870 were detained and 23 placed in custody. Registration with the
NSEERS was conducted in waves: Groups 1, 2, 3 and 4. Group 1 was
comprised of nonimmigrant males from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan and Syria.
Group 2 was nonimmigrant males from Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Eri-
trea, Lebanon, Morocco, North Korea, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Tunisia, the
United Arab Emirates and Yemen. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia comprised
Group 3, according to the INS. Nonimmigrant Pakistani and Saudi Ara-
bian males born before January 13, 1987, make up Call-In Group 3 of the
National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS) and are
required to report to the INS to be interviewed and fingerprinted. Group
4, with a deadline of March 28, consisted of nonimmigrant males from
Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan and Kuwait.'7'
A number of studies by Muslim self-help, immigration reform and
civil rights groups conducted studies on the impact of the "Special Regis-
tration" program. Newspapers 2 as well as investigative reporters covered
168. The DHS never gave a reason for the suspension. The most common reasons for
suspension were: First, NSEERS was inconsistently applied; Second, it was discriminatorily
applied; Third, it was indiscriminately applied; Fourth, it was not cost-effective to apply. Jane
Black, At Justice, NSEERS Spells Data Chaos, BusIEss WEEK, May 2, 2003
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/may2003/tc2003052_6532_tc73.htm.
169. See Agency Information Collection Activities: Proposed Collection, 68 Fed.
Reg. 67,464 (Dec. 2, 2003).
170. Cainkar, supra note 158.
171. Rachel L. Swarns & Christopher Drew, Aftereffects: Immigrants; Fearful, Angry or
Confused, Muslim Immigrants Register, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2003, at Al.
172. See, e.g., Lillian Thomas, Muslim Men Register Warily Under US. Requirement as
Terror Precaution, POsT-GAzarnE, (Pittsburgh), Mar. 16, 2003, at A3 ("If you were called
down-you, a European-American who's a citizen-if you got a call to come down to
some government office, you'd be a little bit nervous." "There is a threat to the U.S. I
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the story with intense interest.173 There were also many personal accounts.
Yashar Haider described what happened to him on February 2, 2003,
when he reported to the San Jos6 INS offices for special registration and
was arrested and detained at theYuba County Jail for allegedly overstaying
his visa for 20 days:
By 9:30 pm we reached Yuba County Jail and the shackles
were removed; we were all thoroughly checked and huddled
into another hall, the so-called "Booking Area." By 11:00 pm
we were getting booked. Tags were issued and my criminal
number 103957 was given to me. For the first time in my life I
realized that my identity was lost and I became a number in
the criminal justice system. My crime was going to the San
Jose INS offices on February 2, 2003, for special registration.
174
"This program has created a culture of anxiety, humiliation, and de-
spair in communities throughout this country," said Samina Faheem,
Executive Director of the American MuslimVoice and Pakistan American
Alliance.7 ' "It has made people feel like common criminals, to register
and re-register every time they leave the country.We are wasting precious
resources on this program."
176
think it's a threat to humanity. If there is reason to interview someone because of suspi-
cious behavior, that's fine. But I don't think it's right, I don't think it's fair, to interview
everyone"); see also Chaleampon Ritthichai, The Special Registration Program, GoTHAM GA-
zETTE, Feb. 2003, http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/20030203/11/270 (Donna
Lieberman, Executive Director at New York Civil Liberty Union: "This definitely bred
fear, intimidation and confusion on the part of many affected ... There are so many who
just don't understand: why them?").
173. Targets of Suspicion: The Impact of Post-9/11 Policies on Muslims, Arabs and South
Asians in the United States, IMMIGR. POL'Y IN Focus Vol. 3(2), (Immigration Policy Center, a
division of the American Immigration Law Foundation,Washington, D.C.) (2004).
174. Press Release, ACLU, Immigrants Targeted for Deportation After Participating
in INS Special Registration Program Speak Out, http://www.aclu.org/safefiree/general/
16830prs20030701.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2006).
175. Immigrants Targeted for Deportation After Participating in INS Special Registration Pro-
gram Speak Out, American Muslim Perspective, July 1, 2003, http://www.civilrights.ghazali.
net/html/bodyaclu-amvpresser.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2006).
176. Id.
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CONCLUSION: IMPACT UPON THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICA
Muslims in America are not the same after 9/11 attacks which
changed America for ever and this change has profoundly affected the
seven million-strong American Muslim community.
-Abdus Sattar Ghazali,
"Portrait of a Post 9/11 American Muslim,"
Al-Jazeerah, September 8, 200517
A. Immediate impact
Never before has an international terrorist act had such a devastating
impact on Muslim life in the U.S. The USA Patriot Act created fear that
gripped Muslim communities.'78 The Muslims in America found them-
selves living in a "virtual internment camp"'179 where everything they said
or did was being closely inspected and negatively construed. IS
MUSLIM POPULATION ESTIMATES OF VIRTUAL INTERNMENT CAMP
Government Action Government Admissions Conservative Estimates
FBI: interviewed/interrogated 27,000 90,000
investigated/questioned/raided
Detained or arrested 6,483 15,000
Deported 3,208 3,208
In process of deportation 13,434 13,434
Undergoing voluntary deportation n/a unknown
Fled the country in fear n/a 50,000
Subpoenas/search warrants 18,000 18,000
NSEERS: special registrationfinterviewed/ 144,513 144,513
fingerprinted/photographed
Under surveillance through libraries n/a unknown
Electronic surveillance n/a 100,000
Gone underground n/a unknown
Total 212,638 434,155
177. Abdus Sattar Ghazali, Portrait of a Post 9/11 American Muslim, A1-Jazeerah, Sept. 8,
2005, http://www.aljazeerah.info (follow Opinion Editorials hyperlink; then follow Sep-
tember 2005 Opinion Editorial Links; then see September 8, 2005).
178. Abdul Malik Mujahid, In a Virtual Internment Camp: Muslim Americans since 9/11,
Soundvision, (2003-2004), http://www.soundvision.com/info/muslims/internment.asp.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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Source: Abdul Malik Mujahid. In a Virtual Internment Camp: Muslim
Americans since 9/11. http://www.soundvision.com/info/muslims/
internment.asp.
There were many documented instances of cruel and illegal treat-
ment of Muslims by federal officials, only some of which were
acknowledged by the DOJ Inspector General. For example, people were
arrested without notice, detained and held incommunicado, deported for
the slightest infraction, and subjected to hearings based on secret evidence
without a charge or evidence of terrorism brought. 8'
Of all the post-9/11 policies, "the National Security Entry-Exit
Registration System (NSEERS), commonly referred to as "Special Regis-
tration," has had the most serious impact on the targeted communities.'82
Interviews conducted with attorneys, community groups and registrants
themselves indicate that the deportations and heightened immigration
scrutiny resulting from NSEERS and other post-9/11 policies have cre-
ated widespread fear, stress and alienation in the nation's Muslim, Arab and
South Asian communities."1"3
NSEERS and other post-9/11 policies have had a devastating im-
pact on Muslim and South Asia immigrant communities. These
communities bore the brunt of post-9/11 restrictive polices and became
targets of suspicion resulting from heightened security.' Particularly:
Fear, stress and alienation: 9/11 policies generated fear, stress and
alienation in Muslims, Arabs and South Asians. This led "many
hard-working, law-abiding new Americans to question their
future in this country."
18'
Confusion and misinformation: Enforcement of NSEERS suffered
from inadequate publicity by the government, misinformation
by the officials, misreporting by the press and erroneous un-
derstanding by the affected public. This led to unintentional
violation and unjust application of the laws.
Selective and discriminatory enforcement: Muslims, Arabs and South
Asians felt that they were targets, and NSEERS enforcement
and immigration laws were selectively and discriminatorily ap-
plied. 6
181. Office of the Inspector Gen. I, supra note 139, at 134.
182. Bill Ong Hing, Misusing Immigration Policies in the Name of Homeland Security, 6
THE NEW CENTENNIAL 195 (2006).
183. Immigration Policy Center, supra note 173, at 1.
184. Id. at 2.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 8-9.
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Economic and social impact: Arrest, detention and deportation of
husbands and fathers affected their households economically.
Deportation placed long time resident and school-age children
in foreign lands. Children 16 years of age and under were af-
forded even less legal rights under NSEERS deportation
policies.'87
Fear and uncertainty: Selected enforcement of minor immigra-
tion regulations in large scale on Muslims, Arabs, and South
Asians generated fear within the ranks of lawful residents and
students. "I' This caused them to turn away from the govern-
ment in providing information'"9 or seeking help."
Unmet legal needs: The afflicted populations, Muslims, Arabs, and
South Asians, were not properly represented and protected le-
gaUy. NSEERS alone generated 14,000 removal cases mostly in
four areas of the nation: New York, Los Angeles, Houston, and
Florida. 9 '
B. Long Term Implications
September 11 brought a lot of changes to America. First and fore-
most were attitudinal changes, e.g. more trust in the government,
increased faith in religion, increased family unity, and more compassion
for strangers. It also caused the public to become more involved and en-
gaged as citizens in a variety of ways, thus revitalizing American
democracy. It motivated people to become more informed about politics,
sacrifice personal rights to the government, get involved in the war on
terror, and feel proud to be American, embracing "patriotism" over "indi-
vidualism."' 92
187. Id. at 7-8.
188. Id. at 15.
189. Id. at 10.
190. Id. at 16-18.
191. Id. at 11-14.
192. Markus Prior, Political Knowledge after September 11, 35 PS: POL. ScI. & POLITICS
523 (2002).
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C. War of Identity"3
But the 9/11 induced changes may also have resulted in misdirected
impact, unintended consequences and other undesirable effects over time.
That is exactly what happened to the Muslim community.194
In the very beginning, the Muslim communities were at a loss as to
what to do. 9/11 stirred up mixed emotions in U.S. Muslims and other
immigrants. Condemnation of the attack raised emotions of guilt for be-
ing Muslim. Criticism of the Bush administration raised feelings of shame
for not being as patriotic as an American should. Nothing they can do
will right the wrong of 9/11 by their "people." In supporting the war
against Osama Bin Laden, they feel lied to by the administration. Finally, it
appears that no matter what they do, Muslims are not judged on their acts
as individuals, but held accountable based on their ethnicity and the color
of their skin.These are no doubt very frustrating and anxious experiences.
In order to alleviate these doubts, tensions, and anxieties, the Muslim
community came together and forged a plan to fight for their own stake
in America.
The motivation to re-invent the Muslim community also has deeper
roots in a concern for justice. Most Islamic scholars agree that jihad is
nothing more than a call for personal struggle, i.e. exerting one's utmost
toward the true path of Islam. It is an effort to purify oneself and get rid
of the evil from within through prayers (salat), giving of alms, helping the
needy (zakat), and fasting during the month of Ramadan. In another
sense, there is a global struggle waged against injustice and oppression.
Hence the Islamic response of jihad is meant to cleanse the world. Of
these two, the first concept of jihad is the most favored. It is the greater
jihad, involving a life-long activity among Muslims. Muslims are pursuing
this by coming together, setting political goals (gaining election), and
more importantly, establishing a socio-political identity in the America
polity.
195
193. Federico V Magdalena, Islam and the Politics of Identity: Lessons from the Phil-
ippines and Southeast Asia, http://www.hawaii.edu/cps/identity.html (last visited Oct. 17,
2006).
194. Muneer Ahmad, Homeland Insecurities: Racial Violence the Day After September 11.
20 Soc. TEXT 101 (2002)(arguing that 9/11 is a rude awakening for Muslims and that
America has never been a place of the free and land of equality; Muslims, like other mi-
norities, need to learn their place in America-not as free willing masters but as
indentured slaves).
195. Mona Eltahawy, 9/11 was Good for the Muslim World, Christian Science Monitor,
Oct. 18, 2005, http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1018/pO9sOl-coop.html.
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D. Consolidating Opposition
Before 9/11, the Muslims and South Asian communities were splin-
tered and disorganized. '96 The first wave of East Asian immigrants who
came in the 1960s and 1970s were technology immigrants. They were
comfortably middle class and contributed more to American life than
they took. The second wave came in the 1980s. They came to the United
States for purposes of family reunion. 197 Soon they became welfare immi-
grants. They took more than they gave from society. They are dependent
on the main culture for welfare and support, and they did not attempt to
integrate. '98 Unlike the Chinese immigrants of old, both of these groups
failed to work with each other. They also lacked a defined identity to rally
around, until, the events of September 11. There is also the younger gen-
eration, who refuses the old identity, and seeks to be accepted into the
mainstream. '99
9/11 and the USAPA helped the Muslim and South Asian commu-
nity to come together as a cohesive group for a common cause; that is the
common cause of protecting themselves against an external threat of post-
9/11 Muslim phobia.2" For example, before 9/11, about eighty percent of
the American public thought it was wrong for law enforcement to use
racial profiling, popularly used to refer to the disproportionate targeting of
African American drivers by police for the offense of "driving while
black."20 1 However, after the shock of the 9/11 attacks, sixty percent fa-
vored racial profiling, "at least as long as it was directed at Arabs and
Muslims" 202
This shift in attitude is a wake up call for Muslims. They must do
something, anything to defend their interests and restore "justice." In the
context of the USAPA this means taking the initiative to proclaim their
196. DawaNet Report 2: Charlotte Muslim Community Overview, Council of American
Muslim Professionals-Charlotte Chapter (March 19,2005, at 6. (Muslim communities are
disorganized due to a lack of leadership and interests) available at http://www.campnet.
net/charlotte-nc/report2final.pdf.
197. Maira, supra note 33.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Kemal Argon, Islam in America: A brief overview and some prospects for resurgence,
http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&lr=&q=cache:ritSUygA4qoj:www.ips.org.pk/
publications/Perspectives/Chapter°/%25206.pdf+ Islam+in+ America: +A+brief+ overview+
and+some+prospects+for+resurgence.
201. Wikipedia, Driving While Black, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Driving_
WhileBlack (last visited Oct. 17, 2006) ("Driving While Black" is a parody of the real
crime driving while intoxicated; it refers to the idea that a motorist can be pulled over by
a police officer simply because he or she is black and then charged with a trivial or per-
haps non-existent offense).
202. David Cole & James Dempsey, Terrorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil
Liberties in the Name of National Security, 168 The New Press (2002).
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loyalty to the flag and condemn the attack in no uncertain terms. This
also means that when they find that their overture is rejected and they are
hated no matter what they do, they must start to turn inward, gaining
emotional support from their own group.
E. Implications for America
For better or worse, 9/11 was a transformational event, for the peo-
ple, for the nation. 9/11 changed the nation's ethos."3 This event has
transformed people's lives. It has made them self conscious of what they
can say or do, what they can read and with whom they can associate. It
has also prepared them for war with a heightened sense of patriotism and
a willingness to stand behind America, "right or wrong." Most signifi-
cantly for this project, it has made some people hate foreigners while
others feel ashamed of their identity.
In terms of culture and values, the biggest discernable change after
9/11 was the nation's dismissive attitude towards human, civil and consti-
tutional rights in the face of terrorist threats. After 9/11, it came to be
considered acceptable, if not even necessary, to torture suspected terrorists
for information,0 4 to imprison terrorists (Taliban and al-Qaeda members)
without due process,"' to compromise citizens' privacy rights in the name
203. Amitai Etzioni, American Society in the Age of Terrorism, http://www.gwu.edu/
-ccps/newsamerican society.htrnl (last visited Nov. 15, 2006) (As reported by Etzioni: "A
year before the attack, in September 2000, Muslim Americans were viewed favorably by
50 percent of Americans, and unfavorably by 21 percent. Six months later, in March 2001,
45 percent viewed Muslim Americans favorably and 24 percent viewed them unfavorably.
Two months after the attack (and the first time the data on this topic was provided after
September 11), the proportion of those who viewed Muslim Americans favorably in-
creased to 59 percent and the proportion who viewed them unfavorably decreased to 17
percent. A few months later, in February and March 2002, the percentages changes only
slightly-54 percent of Americans viewed Muslim Americans favorably and 22 percent
viewed them unfavorably).
204. Dana Priest, Justice Dept. Memo Says Torture "May BeJustified," WASHINGTON POST,
June 13, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A38894-2004Jun13?
language-printer. See also Memorandum from the U.S. Dep't ofJustice to Alberto R. Gon-
zales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/
docs/doj/bybee80102tr.html.
205. Michael Byers, Ignore the Geneva Convention and Put Our Own Citizens at Risk,
62 THE HUMANIST 33, (2002) (The 1949 Geneva Convention on the treatment of prison-
ers of war (PO.Ws) stipulates that they are to be afforded "the same courts according to
the same procedure as in the case of members of the armed forces of the detaining power."
Article 102. Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners ofWar. Adopted on
12 August 1949 by the Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of International
Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War, held in Geneva from 21 April to 12
August, 1949 entry into force 21 October 1950.
By not treating Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters as entitled to PO.W status, the U.S.
violated fundamental principles of international law as well as war conventions, and in
time these actions will put our soldiers at risk and the United States' international human
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of security,2° and to deny information to journalists to facilitate the fight-
ing of a war on terror.
2 7
Finally and most controversially, 9/11 has transformed the United
States from an open, democratic society, to a closed, garrison state.
Michaels outlines twelve defining characteristics, with ratings, of a na-
tional security state. 208 They are:
(1) Visible increase in uniform security (100%), e.g. increased
private security and military jets patrolling the sky.
(2) Lack of accountability in law enforcement (75%), e.g. in-
discriminate arrests and unconstitutional detention of
immigrants.
(3) Reduced judiciary supervision and enhanced executive
mistreatment of suspects (30%), e.g. as evidence of re-
duced judiciary supervision, the establishment of the
military tribunals and expansion of the FISA secretive
courts in the processing of terrorism cases. As to execu-
tive mistreatment of suspects, the government's
discriminatory and abusive treatment of Muslims, abusive
use of FISA process (12,179 cases since 1979 with 1 de-
nied), and the oppressive nature of the Military Tribunal.
(4) Secrecy of ruling authority and momentum of threat
(60%), e.g. the "Secrecy Surrounding the Rationale for
rights leadership under attack); see U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of the Inspector Gen., The
September 11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration
Changes in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks (2003) (The
report examined 762 aliens under Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) custody
as a result of post 9/11 PENTTBOM investigation. The detainees were subject to lengthy
detention without notice, representation and hearing. They were subjected to personal
humiliation and physical abuse without recourse).
206. C. William Michaels, No GREATER THREAT: AMERICA AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 AND
THE RISE OF A NATIONAL SECURITY STATE (Algora Publishing 2002) ("Indeed there is no
greater threat to the security of this country than a systematic dismantling of civil liberties
and the rule of law with a dramatic shift of political will and resources to investigate, sur-
veillance, and prosecution, coupled with the almost uncanny ability of the American
public to place too much faith in government at the precise time when just the opposite
approach is required").
207. Danny Schechter, How Did 9/11 Change Big Media? INTERVENTION MAGAZINE,
Sept. 11, 2003, www.interventionmag.com/cms/modules.php?op=modload&name=
News&file=article&sid=495 (9/11 has changed the media substantially. After 9/11, "patri-
otic correctness" has become in vogue. The media put concern with fear before
commitment to facts. Overall,journalists were more respectful of the authority, more def-
erential to officials, more trusting of government, and less critical of the administration).
208. Michaels, supra note 206 at 299-300 ("The Ratings: A National Security State
'Scorecard,"); see also Mark S. Zaid, Was September 11 Actually a Prelude to 1984?:A Review
of a New Book Forecasting the Possible Rise of a National Security State, FINDLAW,Jan. 24, 2003,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/books/reviews/20030124_zaid.html.
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Afghanistan War and Further Military Actions" and "Se-
cret Surveillance Orders by Expanded FISA Court."
(5) Media in the service of the State (55%), e.g. concentra-
tion of media ownership and lack of criticism of
government activities.
(6) National resources devoted to security threat (85%), e.g.
$40 billion in Congressional emergency appropriations
after 9/11 ear-marked for anti-terrorism activities.
(7) Patriotism moving to nationalism (60%),e.g. American
flag waving, increased enrollment in ROTC and applica-
tion to the FBI and CIA and increased blind trust in the
government.
(8) Lack of critical response by religions (30%), e.g. Bush
enlisting the church to support his war on terror.
(9) Wartime mentality and permanent war economy (100%),
e.g. the establishment of the Department of the Home-
land Security with 170,000 employees and $37.7 billion
of budget for the first year.
(10) Targeted individuals and groups (60%), e.g. dragnet kind
of interviewing and interrogation of foreign nationals
and students, especially those of Middle East origin or
Muslim persuasion.
(11) Direct attack on dissent (10%, e.g. local (e.g. Denver) po-
lice keeping files on peace activists and organizations and
conservative public interest groups reporting and criticiz-
ing views of liberal and anti-war faculty.
(12) Increased surveillance (35%), e.g. increased surveillance in
public places and government involvement with cyber-
space defense.
The impact of the USAPA on Muslims bears witness to such a
transformation process. The impact of 9/11, including the USAPA, and its
implications for America are not yet understood by scholars, nor are they
fully appreciated by the people.
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F. Final Thoughts
Senator Feingold reminded the Nation that "wartime has sometimes
brought us the greatest tests of our Bill of Rights.' 20 9 Looking back in
history, there is ample evidence of backlash against minorities during na-
tional crisis, e.g. the internment of Japanese-Americans, German-
Americans, and Italian-Americans during World War II, the blacklisting of
supposed communist sympathizers during the McCarthy era, and the sur-
veillance and harassment of antiwar protesters, including Dr. Martin
Luther King Jr., during the Vietnam War. The pattern seems to repeat it-
self. With 9/11, we have adopted a policy of large scale preventive
detention of Muslims and wholesale deportation of South Asians. It does
not appear that we, as a nation, have learned from our past mistakes; we
keep on violating Constitutionally-protected rights during national crisis,
only to have to make amends later. The ill treatment of Muslims in Amer-
ica will likely meet with the same fate. The only question is when will the
apology come? By then, it might be too late.
"Oh, "hen will you ever learn?
Oh, Hhen will you ever learn?"
-Pete Seeger (1961)210
Where Have All the Flowers Gone
209. Electronic Privacy Information Center, Statement Of US. Senator Russ Feingold
On The Anti-Terrorism Bill, Oct. 25, 2001 http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/
usapatriot/feingold.html.
210. Pete Seeger, "here Have All the Flowers Gone? On Pete Seeger's Greatest Hits
(Sony 2002).
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